ITSCI response to the 2023 Final report of the Group of Experts on the DRC

Jul 25, 2024

ITSCI actions and control mechanisms to address risks in the Great Lakes Region

July 2024

On 4th July 2024, the UN Group of Experts (GOE) published its 2023 Final report on the DRC (S/2024/432). ITSCI deplores the deterioration of the situation in North Kivu, DRC and wider regional impacts and welcomes the GOE report which adds context to our work bringing incidents of all OECD Annex II risks to the attention of stakeholders and encouraging actions, including individual accountability.

The GOE report covers multiple locations and risks in the DRC, including but not only, on ITSCI implementation areas and/or 3T minerals. It highlights risks related to armed groups interfering with mining activities, mineral fraud, and impact on 3T supply chains including situations reported and acted on by ITSCI. In this response we provide specificity on risks associated with ITSCI supported supply chains and describe example progressive achievements resulting from ITSCI and stakeholder actions.

ITSCI recognises the importance of addressing risks and continuous improvement of our efforts to support communities in high-risk areas already at risk of exploitation and harmful de-risking of supply chains. Our conclusion describes planned follow-up from GOE recommendations. We note differences between ITSCI and other mineral trade figures and continue to seek clarity on this important information.

ITSCI disengagement from ‘Rubaya’

  • GOE discusses risks to mineral supply chains from the ‘Rubaya’ area. Rubaya is the name of the mineral trading town in Masisi Territory in North Kivu Province although its name is often used to refer to various mines and locations in the wider area, creating possible confusion. See Annex A and D for clarification.
  • The ‘Rubaya area’ and much but not all of Masisi territory are to date the only 3T mining area suffering the presence of M23.[1]
  • ITSCI is currently suspended in Masisi territory and has been suspended twice previously in 2023 as security issues required. See Annex B for detail.

Focused ITSCI action plan regarding risks of mineral fraud in Rwanda

  • The GOE states that there has been an unprecedented 50% increase in coltan export from Rwanda between 2022 and 2023. This figure does not reflect coltan exports recorded by ITSCI which increased by 25%. ITSCI cannot comment on non-ITSCI minerals[2] and non-ITSCI actors who operate in Rwanda.
  • Gradual growth and increased production is not unexpected considering the development and formalisation of the mining sector, including due to support from investors and donors, and documented in Rwanda in recent years.
  • Nevertheless, we acknowledge and expect internal fraud within Rwanda due to high numbers of informal mine sites, as well as cross-border fraud. Various actions and controls have been continually introduced by ITSCI both at mine and export level. For example;
    • New requirements on companies to record additional details on mineral characteristics at different stages of the supply chain.
    • Re-emphasising the importance of the due diligence list of mines that is shared with ITSCI members for additional checks and supplier engagement. Any mining company added to that list also receives a joint ITSCI and RMB communication with explanation and recommended actions.
    • Further training for Rwandan exporters focused on improving and documenting plausibility assessment at mine sites and prior to export.
    • Repeating inventory of informal sites in Rwanda shared with RMB with recommendations for formalisation.
    • Enhancing stakeholder participation in District Mining Task Forces (DMTFs) led by Rwandan local authorities who have a mandate in mitigating against illegal activities, including fraud. This cooperation has led to closure of illegal mineral trading depots.
    • Fostering accountability of state services by organising joint mine visits with RMB officers to follow-up on various issues, including plausibility concerns at mine sites.

Risks from ‘Wazalendo’, M23 and NDC-R transparently reported

  • GOE highlights multiple concerns around ‘self-defence’ armed groups acting in loose coalition with the DRC Government to fight against the M23 and ITSCI shares these concerns. ITSCI continues to define Wazalendo as non-state armed groups despite their semi-formal relationships with the Congolese army (FARDC).
  • ITSCI has recorded multiple reports of abuses by Wazalendo elements, in addition to those by rogue FARDC, and works to address these incidents, as explained below.
  • Unlike GOE, ITSCI has so far, no reports of confirmed involvement of PARECO-FF in mining activities at ITSCI-monitored mines.
  • ITSCI acknowledges PARECO-FF general presence in Masisi Territory. This includes on non-ITSCI ex-PE 4731 where Better Mining provided due diligence services from January 2019 to February 2023 (see Annex A) as well as in different locations in Masisi territory, i.e., in villages, controlling transport routes, or fighting alongside FARDC against M23.
  • Until the beginning of May 2024 and the latest suspension of ITSCI tagging in Masisi territory, there were no reports of M23 involved in mining activities at any ITSCI-monitored sites.
  • M23-controlled areas had been a concern for mineral transport routes from Masisi territory to North Kivu provincial capital Goma (see maps in Annex D). This risk resulted in suspension of ITSCI tagging in 2023 and 2024 and led to additional actions (see below).
  • ITSCI has recorded activities of non-state armed group NDC-Rénové (NDC-R). Unlike GOE reporting these relate to Lubero territory, North Kivu, and risks of NDC-R setting up barriers on transport routes in that territory. Minerals from Masisi territory are not transported on those routes and not impacted by risks in Lubero territory.

ITSCI actions to address risks from non-state armed groups and mineral fraud in the DRC

ITSCI took multiple steps to record risks, raise awareness of local stakeholders, discuss disengagement or potential for mitigation with those stakeholders, and record progress of actions. For instance:

  • ITSCI together with local leaders and stakeholders directly engaged with leaders of ‘Wazalendo’ groups who committed to non-interference in or collection of illegal taxes on transport of ITSCI-tagged minerals.
  • Following further awareness raising with Wazalendo and state security forces, 41 barriers were removed to reduce risks of illegal taxation, Wazalendo withdrew from certain mining areas, and reported cases of illegal taxation decreased.
  • To bypass M23 controlled areas, an alternative mineral transport route was established and agreed by all stakeholders, via South Kivu to transport minerals from Masisi, including state security escort to reduce risks of illegal taxation by ‘Wazalendo’.[3]
  • ITSCI documented 18 incidents on the continuation of mining activities during the 2023 and 2024 suspensions of tagging in Masisi territory, the transport of untagged minerals and/or cases of mineral fraud. This includes records of the 36 tonnes of minerals seized by North Kivu authorities (also reported by GOE), and a further 40 tonnes of minerals stored at mine sites in early 2024.[4]
  • To address plausibility risks in Masisi territory in earlier years prior to M23 action, ITSCI had heightened control mechanisms with requirements for additional chain-of-custody documentation at the mine level, moving tagging points closer to the pits, supporting the set-up of registered depots to store documented minerals, increasing joint plausibility assessment with state services and ensuring tight controls of tag distribution based on those assessments.

GOE reports of high risks related to gold do not directly impact ITSCI

  • ITSCI currently supports 3T mineral supply chains only. ITSCI does not work with gold supply chains. We share concerns of GOE on risks presented by uncontrolled gold supply chains.
  • GOE sections III and IV.B reporting on Ituri Province and Fizi Territory, South Kivu Province relate to gold mining. There are no ITSCI activities nor ITSCI-tagged mineral transports in either area.
  • ITSCI does record and address incidents related to gold in our other operational areas if these raise risks for 3T supply chains. For example, 14 incidents were recorded in 2023 in North and South Kivu Province.

Concluding remarks and commitments

ITSCI has demonstrated long-term commitment to the implementation of the OECD Guidance in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas achieved through cooperative engagement with local, national and international stakeholders, including the GOE with whom we have regular engagement.

We acknowledge the recommendations of the GOE directed to our stakeholders and will continue efforts to encourage accountability for rogue FARDC and other individuals responsible for human rights abuses and illegal activities linked to 3T minerals impacting the ITSCI Programme.

All concerns reported by GOE have been evaluated for links to ITSCI supply chains. Any new risks have been recorded as incidents for continued follow-up including with local and provincial multi-stakeholder committees, advocating for actions and providing guidance on risk management (see Annex C). This includes GOE information related to the use of children or to the presence and interference of certain armed groups in mining activities.

We aim to increase emphasis on the need for company due diligence and suggested measures when communicating our first-hand, up-to-date information on risks to ITSCI members. Earlier this year, ITSCI organised a webinar for ITSCI smelters to provide updates and guidance on the situation in North Kivu. We will continue targeted support in the future.

ITSCI holds cross-checked verified trading statistics on relevant supply chains which is regularly reported to members, partner governments and through our website. We will liaise with national governments in the region regarding publication of official data which may include non-ITSCI trade.

***END***

To see the full document, including annexes, please download the full PDF.

Additional resources for more information

[1] Developments in June 2024 indicate movements of M23 in Lubero territory, although currently in areas where there are no ITSCI-monitored mines.

[2] Trade figures are available from various databases but are known to contain frequent discrepancies resulting from recording errors and gaps as well as timing of recording over year end. For example, the UN Comtrade system currently reports an 11% annual increase in Rwandan coltan exports although this is likely under-reporting.

[3] This achievement was made in April 2024, prior to new advancements of M23 in Masisi and suspension of activities at the beginning of May 2024.

[4] This list is not exhaustive. ITSCI opened further incident reports indicating volumes of untagged minerals mined despite the suspension of activities and later identified and documented by state services during joint assessment visits with ITSCI.

 

DOWNLOAD STATEMENT IN ENGLISH
DOWNLOAD STATEMENT IN FRENCH